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Abstract
Although most policy studies argue there has been no influence of  Islam on 
Indonesia's foreign policy, the foreign relations of  the Republic of  Indonesia 
during the revolution for independence provide a counter-example. Because of  
the greater role for society in conducting, rather than just influencing, foreign 
relations, Islam was used as a key element in Indonesia's diplomatic efforts 
in the Arab world between 1945 and 1949. This led to several key, early 
successes for Indonesia on the world stage, but changing circumstances meant 
that relations with the Arab world and thus the place of  Islam in foreign 
policy were no longer prominent from 1948.
[Meskipun sebagian besar studi mengenai kebijakan luar negeri Indonesia 
menyatakan tidak adanya pengaruh Islam dalam hal tersebut, kebijakan 
pada zaman revolusi kemerdekaan memperlihatkan adanya pengaruh itu. 
Karena adanya peran yang lebih besar bagi masyarakat dalam membentuk 
dan menjalankan kebijakan pada saat itu, Islam digunakan sebagai sebuah 
elemen pokok dalam menjalankan hubungan diplomatik Indonesia dengan 
dunia Arab dari tahun 1945 hingga 1949. Hal ini mengarah ke beberapa 
keberhasilan awal yang menonjol bagi Indonesia di pentas internasional. 
Namun,  sesuai dengan perubahan keadaan dunia sesudah tahun 1948, 
hubungan dengan dunia Arab menjadi tidak sepenting sebelumnya serta 
peranan Islam semakin memudar dan tidak lagi menjadi elemen kebijakan 
luar negeri. ]
Keywords: foreign policy, Indonesia, Indonesian revolution, Egypt, Arab 
League
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A. Introduction
Indonesia, despite being the world’s most populous Muslim-
majority country, has since independence pursued a non-sectarian state 
and a non-sectarian national identity. Throughout the first half  century 
of  the country’s independence --and especially throughout most of  the 
Soeharto regime (1966-1998)-- Islam was not an ideology on which policy 
was based, an instrument of  implementing policy, nor a rhetoric used 
to justify policy to the Indonesian public, even when it was occasionally 
used as a tool to win support for the regime.1 Although studies suggest 
a surge of  Islamic influence on Indonesian politics in the last twenty 
years --seemingly more in form than in substance2-- there remains a 
strong narrative that Islam was not crucial to Indonesia’s anti-colonial 
nationalism or early statehood and did not play a prominent role in the 
country’s development.3
This idea of  the irrelevance of  Islam is particularly acute when 
looking at studies of  Indonesia’s foreign policy. The broad consensus in 
the literature and among diplomats is that Indonesia has not deployed 
Islam in its foreign affairs. Surin Pitsuwan, the Thai Muslim former 
Secretary-General of  the Association of  Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN), has said in a recent speech, “We have not seen an element of  
Islam in the foreign policy of  Indonesia since the beginning,” meaning 
the country’s founding in 1945.4 Similarly, the British-based scholar 
of  Indonesian foreign policy Michael Leifer has written “it should be 
pointed out that Islam has never exercised a perceptible influence on the 
international outlook of  the Indonesian state; nor has it enjoyed a place in 
the formal rhetoric of  Indonesia’s foreign policy.”5 The same conclusion 
1 Robert W. Hefner, Civil Islam: Muslims and Democratization in Indonesia (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2000).
2 Robin Bush, “Regional Sharia Regulations in Indonesia: Anomaly or 
Symptom?”, in Expressing Islam Religious Life and Politics in Indonesia., ed. by Greg Fealy 
and Sally White (Singapore: Institute of  Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS), 2008); Merle 
Calvin Ricklefs, Islamisation and Its Opponents in Java: A Political, Social, Cultural and Religious 
History, c. 1930 to Present (Singapore: NUS Press, 2012), p. 259.
3 R.E. Elson, “Absent at the Creation: Islamism’s Belated, Troubled Engagement 
with Early Indonesian Nationalism”, in Anthony Reid and the Study of  the Southeast Asian 
Past, ed. by Geoff  Wade and Li Tana (Singapore: Institute of  Southeast Asian Studies, 
2012), pp. 303–35.
4 Surin Pitsuwan, “The ASEAN Community 2015: Challenges and Opportunities 
for the Muslims of  Southeast Asia”, lecture at Oxford University, 28 Jan 2013.
5 Michael Leifer, “The Islamic Factor in Indonesia’s Foreign Policy: A Case of  
Functional Ambiguity”, in Islam in Foreign Policy, ed. by Adeed Dawisha (Cambridge: 
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has also been drawn by Indonesian scholarship on the country’s foreign 
relations.6 Even those Indonesian scholars who see a growing role for 
Islam in the country’s rhetoric (although not necessarily policy) today 
have written that until recently the role of  Islam has been only “as a 
constraining factor on a limited number of  issues.”7 
Instead of  focusing on Islam, scholarship on Indonesia’s foreign 
relations, especially in the earliest period of  independence, has highlighted 
Indonesia’s relationships with the United States,8 the United Nations,9 
and, of  course, the country’s former colonial overlord, the Netherlands.10 
Understandably, relations with these countries did not emphasize religion, 
and especially not Islam. When looking at relations between Indonesia 
and other Asian and African states, Dewi Fortuna Anwar argued that 
“Solidarity among developing countries took precedence over solidarity 
among Muslim countries as co-religionists per se.”11
The only caveat suggested by studies so far has been the nuanced 
argument of  the Indonesian scholar Anak Agung Banyu Perwita. He 
has noted that although formal governmental policy has not prioritized 
Cambridge University Press, 1983), p. 148.
6 Kirdi Dipoyudo, “Indonesia’s Foreign Policy towards the Middle East and 
Africa”, The Indonesian Quarterly, vol. 13, no. 4 (1985), pp. 474–85; this text does not 
specifically deny any Islamic connection, but it makes no mention of  one, and never 
uses the words “Islam” or “Muslim.” More clearly un-Islamic is the account written 
by the famous Balinese diplomat Ide Anak Agung Gde Agung, Twenty Years Indonesian 
Foreign Policy 1945-1965 (The Hague: Mouton, 1973).
7 Dewi Fortuna Anwar, “Foreign Policy, Islam and Democracy in Indonesia”, 
Journal of  Indonesian Social Sciences and Humanities, vol. 3 (2010), p. 47; This is also the 
position of  Azyumardi Azra, “Islam in Indonesian Foreign Policy”, in Indonesia, Islam, 
and Democracy: Dynamics in a Global Context (Jakarta: Solstice Publishing, 2006), pp. 89–111.
8 Andrew Roadnight, United States Policy towards Indonesia in the Truman and 
Eisenhower Years (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002); Robert J. McMahon, Colonialism 
and Cold War: The United States and the Struggle for Indonesian Independence, 1945-49 (Ithaca, 
NY: Cornell University Press, 1981); Paul F. Gardner, Shared Hopes, Separate Fears: Fifty 
Years of  U.S.-Indonesia Relations (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1997); Frances Gouda 
and Thijs Brocades Zaalberg, American Visions of  the Netherlands East Indies/Indonesia: US 
Foreign Policy and Indonesian Nationalism, 1920-1949 (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University 
Press, 2002).
9 Alastair M. Taylor, Indonesian Independence and the United Nations (London: 
Stevens, 1960); This is also the emphasis of  the diplomatic elements in  George 
McTurnan Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia (Itaca, NY: Cornell University 
Press, 1952).
10 Jon M. Reinhardt, Foreign Policy and National Integration: The Case of  Indonesia 
(New Haven, CT: Yale University Southeast Asia Studies, 1971).
11 Anwar, “Foreign Policy”, p. 47.
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Islamic interests, societal pressures from Muslims and Muslim groups in 
the country have shaped and constrained the government’s approach to 
certain issues.12 Perwita’s observations focused on the New Order period, 
when foreign policy was managed with a strong hand by the Soeharto 
regime. It raises questions, though, about the possibility of  greater societal 
influence on Indonesia’s foreign policy and the impact this would have 
on the position of  Islam. If  society was able to insert Islam into foreign 
policy in a marginal way (as a prompt or constraint) in the Soeharto era 
--when the state was at its strongest-- one should look to other periods 
when society was stronger to provide a greater role for Islam. This 
also opens up broader questions of  Indonesia’s global position in the 
mid-twentieth century, including whether developing country solidarity 
was ideological or merely pragmatic, and how different sectors of  the 
bureaucracy or wider society held different visions of  trans-regional links 
in periods when society had more impact on policy. 
This article will focus on just such a period: Indonesia’s revolution 
for independence, from the proclamation of  independence in August 
1945 until the formal transfer of  sovereignty from the Dutch in 
December 1949. This was an exceptional time because strong initiative 
taken by individuals and groups of  Indonesians had a major impact on 
Indonesia’s foreign policy, independent of  the preference of  the state’s 
leaders. In this context, Indonesia had exceptionally strong diplomatic 
relationships with Arab countries in the Middle East. These relationships 
were forged on the rhetorical foundation of  Islamic brotherhood and 
co-religionist solidarity. This case demonstrates that at the moment of  
greatest popular participation in Indonesia’s foreign policy, Islam played 
an important role. This has broader implications for reconsidering the 
role of  Islam in the early independent Indonesian sand the ways in which 
societal actions must be considered when evaluating the place of  religion 
in the Indonesian state, especially at moments when society was strong 
and the state was weak.
 The major limiting factor in the study of  Indonesia’s diplomatic 
history has been Indonesia’s reticence to open the archives of  its 
Ministry of  Foreign Affairs.  This non-disclosure is fuelled both by 
an understandable scepticism about disclosing information related to 
national security and international relations (even the Availability of  
Public Information Law of  2008 had sweeping exceptions related to 
12 Anak Agung Banyu Perwita, Indonesia and the Muslim World: Islam and Secularism 
in the Foreign Policy of  Soeharto and Beyond (Copenhagen: NIAS Press, 2007).
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perceived “security” topics)13 and by institutional inertia that cannot easily 
accommodate a change in mentality to open public archives. Because of  
the heavy societal participation during the revolution, however, many 
other sources describe aspects of  diplomatic relations and the promotion 
of  the Indonesian cause. Thus, this article establishes the role of  Islam 
in Indonesia’s foreign relations --in this case in the Middle East between 
1945 and 1949-- from other archival collections, published sources, 
memoirs, oral histories, and contemporary news accounts.
During this period, Indonesia’s priority (both for the state and 
societal groups) was seeking recognition of  its independence from the 
Netherlands, after the former colonial power had re-invaded in the wake 
of  the Second World War. Groups of  Indonesians organized in Cairo, 
Mecca, and elsewhere to push Arab governments towards supporting the 
Indonesian cause. The efforts in Cairo were both particularly Islamic in 
content and particularly successful, leading to recognition by the Arab 
League and subsequently by Egypt and other Arab states. Recognition by 
these Arab states was important for Indonesia because this allowed them 
to internationalize the conflict, denying the Netherlands the ability to call 
the war in Indonesia an “internal” problem immune from international 
meddling.
Around 1948, the diplomatic situation changed to reflect new 
situations in both Indonesia and the Arab Middle East. In Indonesia, the 
nascent Republic was taking stronger control of  foreign policy and chose 
to channel attention more towards international bodies (especially the 
UN) and major Western states. This led to a decline in Islamic appeals 
and connections. In the Arab Middle East, the crisis surrounding the 
creation of  the state of  Israel became the full focus of  local governments, 
pulling them away from advocacy for Indonesia. As a result, Indonesian 
foreign policy downplayed Islam in the final years of  the revolution, even 
as societal groups continued to work in Egypt and the Hejaz. In foreign 
affairs, as with other aspects of  Indonesian policy, the increasing strength 
of  the state caused the role of  Islam to decline.
B. The Background of  the Indonesian Revolution
The Dutch were intensively involved in trade in Southeast Asia 
from the seventeenth century onward, but from around 1820 their 
13 Undang-undang Keterbukaan Informasi Publik, no. 14 / 2008 (Law no. 14 
of  2008), see especially chapter V on Classified Information, Article 17.
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exclusive trading zones and special treaties rapidly evolved into formal 
territorial colonialism. Circa 1911, they had consolidated political control 
over a vast archipelagic territory, which they called the Netherlands Indies. 
Stretching from Sumatra to Papua (with the exclusion of  the Portuguese 
colony of  East Timor), the borders established by Dutch imperialism 
later became the boundaries that defined Indonesian nationalism. The 
nationalist movement gained strength through the 1910s and 1920s, 
suffering fractures and setbacks into the 1930s but still captivating the 
attention of  the native elites. This narrative of  local challenges to Dutch 
authority was sharply interrupted in 1942, when the Japanese quickly 
conquered the whole territory and integrated it into their wartime Greater 
East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere until 1945.
On August 17, 1945, just days after the unconditional surrender 
of  the Japanese in the Second World War, Indonesia proclaimed its 
independence, in a speech by the two long-time leaders of  the secular 
nationalist movement: Sukarno and Mohammad Hatta. Putting this 
proclamation into action was difficult, though. At this point, the dream of  
Indonesian independence was staunchly opposed by the former colonial 
power. At the end of  the Second World War, the Netherlands declared its 
intention to keep the colony, enlisted the support of  its European allies, 
and re-invaded Indonesia, which resulted in a four-year war to uphold 
Indonesian independence. This four-year war is known in Indonesia as 
the Revolution.
In Indonesia’s Revolution, military conflicts on the ground 
dominated the popular experience, but were not the ultimate determinant 
of  the outcome.14 Rather, Indonesia’s independence reflected the decisive 
influence of  international politics and new international institutions after 
World War II. As Samuel Crowl has noted, “Indonesians were the first 
colonial subjects to successfully use diplomacy as a weapon against a 
colonial power in an independence struggle.”15 The new United Nations 
Organization took up Indonesia’s case in plenary debates in 1947, and 
the UN-created “Committee of  Good Offices” facilitated negotiations 
between Dutch and Indonesian representatives leading to the final 
14 For a still-unsurpassed account of  the Indonesian revolution that balances 
on-the-ground military conflict with international diplomacy, see Kahin, Nationalism 
and Revolution.
15 Samuel E. Crowl, “Indonesia’s Diplomatic Revolution: Lining Up for Non-
Alignment, 1945-1955”, in Connecting Histories: Decolonization and the Cold War in Southeast 
Asia, 1945-1962 (Stanford, CA: Woodrow Wilson Center Press and the Stanford 
University Press, 2009), p. 238.
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settlement in 1949.
In the new global context of  international institutions, though, 
Indonesia stood in need of  many kinds of  international allies.16 Thus, 
the new government looked to both traditional and circumstantial friends 
for support in various ways.  Other formerly colonized countries in the 
developing world came to Indonesia’s aid in the UN discussions. India 
received much attention for being particularly supportive, but even Latin 
American countries helped support the Indonesian cause.17 Australia 
also played a key role as Indonesia’s choice in the Committee of  Good 
Offices.18 In many places, the diplomatic work on the Indonesian side 
to win such support from other countries was done by self-appointed 
individuals: Indonesians who happened to be present in foreign capitals 
when the Revolution broke out. This was the case in Australia, where 
Indonesians who had been interned in the country won over the support 
of  the labor movement as a whole.19 Indonesians also took up the new 
country’s cause in the United States, the Czech Republic, and in the 
Middle East.20 These Indonesians abroad could be students, as was the 
case for most in the Middle East, but they could also be traders, activists 
or laborers.
Amidst the various kinds of  support received from around the 
world for the Indonesian Revolution, many early and concrete diplomatic 
steps were taken by Arab countries. Arab countries, of  course, had a 
more long-standing connection with Indonesians, especially the centres 
16 This idea is articulated particularly well in Ibid., pp. 238–57.
17 Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution, pp. 400, 16.
18 For an account that highlights Indian and Australian contributions, see 
Crowl, “Indonesia’s Diplomatic Revolution”. See also Stephen Gapps, “Black Armada: 
Australian Support for Indonesian Independence”, Australian National Maritime Museum, 
http://stories.anmm.gov.au/blackarmada/, accessed 16 Feb 2016. 
19 This has been described especially by the leader of  the Indonesian activists in 
Australia at the time, Mohamad Bondan, Genderang Proklamasi di Luar Negeri, 1st edition 
(Jakarta: Pertjetakan Kawal, 1971); see also his wife’s account, Molly Bondan, Spanning 
a Revolution: The Story of  Mohamad Bondan and the Indonesian Nationalist Movement (Jakarta: 
Pustaka Sinar Harapan, 1992).
20 Crowl, “Indonesia’s Diplomatic Revolution”, p. 240; Mien Soedarpo, 
Reminiscences of  the Past, vol. 2, ed. by Siti Nuraini Barnett (Jakarta: Sejati Foundation 
with PT Gramedia Widiasarana Indonesia, 1997); Arsip Nasional Republik Indonesia, 
Koleksi RA3 “Djogdja Documenten 1945-1949,” no. 306: “Surat-surat dari Perwakilan 
Republik Indonesia di beberapa negara.”
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of  traditional Islamic learning in Cairo and Mecca.21 Into the twentieth 
century, Islamic reformism from Cairo helped to kick off  modern politics 
and religious activism in Indonesia.22 The increasing connectedness of  the 
Islamic world in this period facilitated ever rising numbers of  Indonesians 
going to the Middle East, and increasing numbers of  Arabs in Indonesia, 
too.23 The majority of  Indonesians in the Middle East went for the 
pilgrimage to Mecca, but many extended their sojourns for study, either 
in the Hijaz or in Cairo, and occasionally in other Arab centres of  learning 
such as Baghdad. Being absent from the homeland, though, did not mean 
they were disconnected from it. In the 1920s and 1930s, Indonesian 
students in Cairo especially were active in nationalist organizations and 
publishing Malay-language journals about religious and political issues.24 
Supra-ethnic, regional, Islamic solidarity forged in the Middle East among 
Indonesian Muslims transformed into a religious nationalism that ran 
alongside, but was not subsumed by, secular nationalism.25 There was also 
an awareness in the Arab world of  Southeast Asian Muslims as part of  
the greater Islamic community jointly struggling towards modernity. For 
example, the classic 1931 treatise by Shakib Arslan, “The Causes of  Our 
Decline,” expounding on the position of  Muslims in a world dominated 
by European Christians, was written in response to a question from an 
21 Christiaan Snouck Hurgronje, Mekka in the Latter Part of  the 19th Century: Daily 
Life, Customs and Learning, the Moslims of  the East-Indian Archipelago (Leiden: Brill, 2007).
22 Deliar Noer, The Modernist Muslim Movement in Indonesia, 1900-1942 (Singapore: 
Oxford University Press, 1973).
23 R. Michael Feener, “New Networks and New Knowledge: Migrations, 
Communications and the Refiguration of  the Muslim Community in the Nineteenth 
and Early Twentieth Centuries”, in The New Cambridge History of  Islam, ed. by Robert W. 
Hefner (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), pp. 37–68; Eric Tagliacozzo, 
The Longest Journey: Southeast Asians and the Pilgrimage to Mecca: Southeast Asians and the 
Pilgrimage to Mecca (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013); Engseng Ho, The Graves of  
Tarim: Genealogy and Mobility across the Indian Ocean: Genealogy and Mobility across the Indian 
Ocean (Berkeley, CA: University of  California Press, 2006); Natalie Mobini-Kesheh, 
The Hadrami Awakening: Community and Identity in the Netherlands East Indies, 1900-1942 
(Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Southeast Asia Program, 1999).
24 William R. Roff, “Indonesian and Malay Students in Cairo in the 1920s”, 
Indonesian, no. 9 (1970), pp. 73–87.
25 Michael Francis Laffan, Islamic Nationhood and Colonial Indonesia: The Umma 
Below the Winds (London: Routledge, 2003). This scholarship on contributions to 
Indonesian nationalism from the Middle East has recently been tempered by Elson, 
“Absent at the Creation.”
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Indonesian imam.26
With this foundation, it is no surprise that Arab countries in the 
Middle East were some of  the early targets for Indonesian diplomatic 
efforts. The key theme in using Islam for Indonesia’s diplomatic outreach 
was the motto of  Islamic Brotherhood (Ar., ukhuwah Islamiyah).27 Islamic 
Brotherhood as a doctrine emphasizes the fellowship of  all Muslims, 
joined through their shared religious beliefs, and the obligation for 
mutual help among them. This is notably different from pan-Islamism, 
another important ideology in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, 
which sought a political unity of  all Muslims under a single state with 
global reach.28 Islamic brotherhood, by contrast, emphasized the fraternal 
actions of  individual Muslims and remained ambiguous towards state 
power; as such, it was the perfect ideology for societal groups abroad 
pushing other Muslims to support Indonesian independence. Societal 
groups were able to mobilize this ideology to gain the support of  key 
Muslims in the Arab world. These Muslim leaders were then able to drive 
states and international organizations to action.
C. Islam in Initial Public Relations by Societal Groups
The societal groups that pioneered the Indonesian cause in the 
Middle East were student groups. Although many of  these groups had 
been active as welfare or scholarly organizations in key centres of  learning 
before the Second World War, their role transformed into lobbying 
organizations quickly in 1945. Islam was important within the groups, 
convincing members that Indonesian independence was an important 
goal, but also outside the groups, appealing to Middle Eastern Muslims.29
In 1945 when Indonesian independence was proclaimed, 
organizations of  Southeast Asian Muslims were active across the 
26 Moch Nur Ichwan, “Differing Responses to an Ahmadi Translation and 
Exegesis: The Holy Qur’ân in Egypt and Indonesia”, Archipel, vol. 62, no. 1 (2001), 
pp. 149–50.
27 Not to be confused with the religious-cum-political group in Egypt, the 
Muslim Brethren or Muslim Brotherhood (Ar. Ikhwān al-Muslimīn).
28 J.M. Landau, “Pan-Islamism,” Encyclopaedia of  Islam, ed. by P. Bearman, 
Th. Bianquis, C.E. Bosworth, E. van Donzel, and W.P. Heinrichs, (Leiden: Brill, 
2014), http://referenceworks.brillonline.com/entries/encyclopaedia-of-islam-2/
pan-islamism-SIM_6069 
29 On ways in which Islam was an important basis to mobilize support for 
independence back in Indonesia, see Kevin William Fogg, “The Fate of  Muslim 
Nationalism in Independent Indonesia”, PhD. Thesis (Yale University, 2012), pp. 159–70.
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Middle East, many of  them also benefitting from cooperation between 
Indonesian and Malayan students. In Egypt, the leading group was the 
Persatuan Pemuda Indonesia-Malaya (Perpindom, Union of  Indonesian-
Malayan Youth), formed around a core of  students but also with some 
graduates who were still resident in the city.30 According to a newspaper 
account in July 1946, based on interviews with returning sailors who had 
passed through Cairo on their journey back from the Netherlands, there 
were about 70 Indonesian students in Egypt who had stayed through 
the Second World War, struggling against food shortages and a lack of  
communication with their homeland.31 Saudi Arabia had by far the largest 
population of  Indonesians in the Middle East --between 3,500 and 4,000 
individuals at the start of  the revolution32-- and the analogous collective 
there was called Persatuan Talabah Indonesia-Malaya (Pertindom, Union 
of  Indonesian-Malayan Students). Iraq was a much smaller outpost, 
but still had its own group, the Majlis Kebangsaan Indonesia-Malaya 
(Makindom, National Council of  Indonesia-Malaya), centred in Baghdad.33 
One of  the activists in Cairo compared these rag-tag student groups to 
the militias that were springing up to defend Indonesia’s independence 
on the country’s own soil at the time.34
Despite not being the largest, the group in Cairo was the most 
active in promoting Indonesian independence in the early years of  the 
revolution. One of  the leaders of  Perpindom in Cairo was a young, 
ethnically-Minangkabau activist named M. Zein Hassan, and Hassan’s 
memoir, written thirty years later, provides an important but partial 
account of  Indonesia’s diplomatic developments in the Middle East 
during the Revolution. This account is partial in two senses: first, it is 
(like any single historical document) incomplete --limited by his location 
in Cairo and inability to record every event; second, it is biased (i.e., not 
impartial) by very much taking the side of  Perpindom and promoting the 
organization’s role (and Hassan’s own role) in diplomacy. This account, 
though, fits well with other extant sources to create a fuller picture of  
30 Perpindom was the heir and fusion of  two earlier student organizations in 
Egypt: Nadi Pemoeda Indonesia dan Malaja and Djamijatoel Chairijah. See Tengkoe 
Jafizham, Studenten Indonesia di Mesir (Medan: Sinar Deli, 1939), pp. 75–6; Jafizham was 
present when this fusion occurred.
31 “Nasib Poetera2 Indonesia di Mesir dan Arab,” Lasjkar (25 Jul 1946).
32 See the various estimates in Muhammad Zein Hassan, Diplomasi Revolusi 
Indonesia di Luar Negeri (Jakarta: Bulan Bintang, 1980), p. 35; “Nasib Poetera2 Indonesia”.
33 On the organizations, see Ibid., p. 23.
34 Ibid., p. 20.
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what was happening on the ground. For example, the work Hassan 
reports of  building solidarity among dockworkers on the Suez Canal 
(to hamper Dutch ships passing through this international passageway) 
fits very closely with the accounts given by sailors who had returned 
to Indonesia from the Middle East,35 and the description of  a close 
working relationship with Azzam Pasha, secretary of  the Arab League, 
was confirmed in the Indonesian press and in later accounts by Azzam 
Pasha himself.36
The activists in Indonesian associations across the Middle East 
initiated a public relations campaign soon after news of  the proclamation 
of  independence reached them in September 1945 (almost a full month 
after the proclamation itself  because of  Allied censorship on the issue).37 
The committee scrambled to put out information about Indonesia’s 
independence struggle, even though they did not have full or accurate 
information themselves. This led to the publication of  a book in Arabic, 
Indonesia ath-Thawrah (Indonesia in Revolution), with certain episodes 
completely fabricated, such as Sukarno’s proclamation of  independence 
in front of  a massive crowd in Jakarta’s central square (in fact, it happened 
before a small group at a house on a major thoroughfare).38
The first coordination between the various Indonesian organizations 
across the Middle East came in November 1945. Taking advantage of  
hajj season, leaders of  Perpindom, Pertindom, and Makindom met in 
Mecca on November 13, to coordinate their efforts. They all agreed 
to follow the political program set in Cairo, because they saw Cairo as 
the diplomatic seat of  the Arab world.39 After this face-to-face contact, 
the organizations were able to keep in touch with the help of  the Iraqi 
ambassador in Cairo, who allowed the Indonesians to use the security 
of  his diplomatic pouch for transferring messages safe from the prying 
eyes of  the Dutch.40
35 Compare Ibid., p. 224ff., and “Nasib Poetera2 Indonesia”.
36 See a picture of  Azzam Pasha, seemingly with Zein Hassan and his colleagues 
of  Perpindom, in Hikmah (June 1949), p. 25; and the account in Ali Sastroamidjojo, 
Milestones on My Journey: The Memoirs of  Ali Sastroamijoyo, Indonesian Patriot and Political 
Leader, ed. by Christiaan Lambert Maria Penders (St. Lucia, Queensland: University of  
Queensland Press, 1979), p. 152.
37 Hassan, Diplomasi Revolusi, p. 49.
38 Ibid., pp. 51–2. Hassan transliterates the book title as Indonesia as-Sairah; 
unfortunately, I have not been able to locate any original copy.
39 Ibid., p. 57.
40 Ibid., p. 33.
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As they began efforts aimed at increasing the profile of  their 
national struggle, Indonesian groups frequently made use of  Islamic 
symbols. For example, in the closing months of  1945, the Indonesian 
committees across the region convinced mosques around the Arab 
countries to hold special prayers for the “souls of  the Indonesian martyrs 
of  Surabaya,” a major battle early in the war.41 A similar tactic was 
taken later, upon the death of  a leading Islamic cleric in Surabaya, the 
Muhammadiyah leader K.H. Mas Mansur. The Cairo committee turned 
it into a propaganda point, “degrading the humanity of  the Dutch and 
their English allies” that such a casualty could happen under their watch.42 
Students in the organization reportedly “wrote in the local Egyptian 
newspapers, attended political meetings in Cairo and met important 
political figures to ask for their support for Indonesian independence.”43 
Throughout, they used Islam as a mobilizing factor. Presenting a message 
to Arab foreign ministers as the revolution began, Indonesian students 
had intentionally mentioned Islam when describing their country: Hassan 
spoke of  Indonesia as a country of  “70 million, among whom 90% 
consist of  Muslims,” or even as an “Eastern Islamic country.”44
To help their own public relations efforts, the Indonesians in Cairo 
created an organization to mobilize Arab voices in favour of  Indonesian 
independence. This group, formed in October 1945, was called Lajnatud 
Difa’i ‘an Indonesia, or the Committee to Defend Indonesia. Its members 
included luminaries from Arab society, like ‘Abd al-Raḥmān ‘Azzām 
(often called Azzam Pasha in the Indonesian accounts), Secretary-General 
of  the nascent Arab League, and Habib Bourguiba, future president 
of  Tunisia.45 In circulating the Committee’s goals to governments, the 
honorary head, Gen. Saleh Harb Pasha, repeatedly pointed to “Islamic 
brotherhood” as his motivating goal, showing the importance of  this 
41 Ibid., p. 89.
42 Ibid., p. 275. For more information on the passing of  Mas Mansur in the 
context of  Indonesia, see oral history with Harsono Tjokroaminoto, interviewed by 
Wardiningsih Surjohardjo, Arsip Nasional Republik Indonesia, “Koleksi Sejarah Lisan”, 
1982 no. 60, especially tape 28 on the revolutionary period.
43 These were the activities reported in interviews by Harun Nasution and Fu’ad 
Fakhruddin, two Indonesian students in Cairo at the time; Mona Abaza, Indonesian 
Students in Cairo: Islamic Education: Perceptions and Exchange (Paris: Association Archipel, 
1994), p. 82.
44 Quoted in Hassan, Diplomasi Revolusi, p. 42.
45 Ibid., p. 62; Abaza, Indonesian Students in Cairo, p. 81.
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idea for diplomatic relations.46 Similarly, a former Egyptian ambassador 
to London, Dr. Hafiz Afifi Pasha, agreed to help lobby on behalf  of  the 
Indonesians to the United Nations meeting in Great Britain in 1946, 
reportedly inspired by the fact that Egyptians and Indonesians “had the 
same religion, traditions, and goals.”47
The talking point of  Islamic brotherhood was impressed on 
the Arab public by careful messaging on the part of  the Indonesian 
students of  Perpindom. When the first official Indonesian delegation 
was passing through the Middle East in April 1946 (on its way to and 
from negotiations in the Netherlands), the local committee encouraged 
them to use Islamic rhetoric and to push especially hard on the theme of  
Islamic Brotherhood, as the Indonesians in Cairo believed that this was 
the most effective strategy for drawing in the Arab world.48 This was not 
the only option available to them; to internationalize the war in Indonesia 
the delegation could have played on anti-colonialism, nationalism, or 
anti-European sentiments, as New York Times articles of  the era did, for 
example, to connect Egypt and Indonesia.49 Islamic brotherhood must 
have been a conscious and strategic emphasis, and it was an effective 
one to draw other sovereign states’ interest and deny the Netherlands the 
excuse that Indonesia was an “internal matter” and thus prevent great 
power interference.
The effects of  internationalization through Islamic rhetoric were 
felt particularly in Egypt. Egyptians participated in a boycott of  Dutch 
ships, and even harassed and encircled Dutch ships passing through 
the Suez Canal to prevent them from boarding new supplies.50 By late 
September 1946, the Egyptian newspaper Al Ichwanoel Moeslimin (Muslim 
Brethren) editorialized in favour of  recognizing the Indonesian Republic.51 
Indonesian students reported that Egyptian political parties from across 
the political spectrum, from the nationalist Wafd through the socialist 
Misr al-Fatāh and even the Communists were working with them to 
46 Ibid., p. 66.
47 Ibid., p. 122.
48 Ibid., p. 137.
49 “Britain and Egypt,” The New York Times (6 Apr 1946).
50 Hassan, Diplomasi Revolusi, p. 234; Crowl, “Indonesia’s Diplomatic Revolution”, 
p. 242; Abaza, Indonesian Students in Cairo, p. 86.
51 “Akoeilah Repoeblik Indonesia: Desakan sk di Mesir,” Lasjkar (11 November 
1946). It is possible that the report was mistaken, and this urging came from the mass 
organization known as the Muslim Brotherhood, but the Brotherhood did have a 
newspaper subsidiary in this period.
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promote Indonesian independence. Despite working with a broad cross-
section of  society, the sympathies among the Indonesian students most 
commonly lay with the Muslim Brothers organization.52 Their most 
important support, though, came from the diplomatic community.
D. Indonesia and the Arab League
After the seeds had been sown by the Indonesian students in Cairo, 
the initiative to support Indonesia’s independence was taken up by the 
diplomats and political leaders. However, it was not primarily Indonesian 
diplomats (Indonesia was still unable to send ambassadors abroad at 
this stage), but rather Arab diplomats, who moved forward on the issue 
--particularly diplomats from a newly emerging organization in Cairo.
The League of  Arab States, more popularly known as the Arab 
League, was created as a supra-national organization only in 1944,53 but 
it played an important role in the story of  early Indonesian diplomacy. 
Because Indonesia’s independence also came soon after the Arab League 
was created, it was also an early test case for the League’s member states 
trying to assert influence internationally.
Arab League attention to the Indonesian issue began quite early. 
In a speech in the American University of  Cairo on January 4, 1946, 
the Secretary-General assured his audience that the new organization 
was “defending justice and liberty everywhere, be it in Indonesia or in 
a defeated Germany.”54 On April 8, 1946, less than nine months after 
Indonesia proclaimed independence, the Arab League issued its first 
resolution on the Indonesian national struggle. The text ran thus: “The 
Council seized an opportunity during the passage through Cairo of  the 
Indonesian delegation going to Holland to declare its sympathy for 
Indonesia and its wish that it would secure full independence.”55 This was 
just two days after it formally resolved to support Libyan independence, 
52 Abaza, Indonesian Students in Cairo, p. 81, citing an interview with Yussuf  Saad 
in Cairo, 4 Oct 1987. Yussuf  Saad was an Indonesian student in Cairo in the 1940s, and 
he returned to work in the Indonesian embassy there much later.
53 Majid Khadduri, “The Arab League as a Regional Arrangement”, The American 
Journal of  International Law, vol. 40, no. 4 (1946), p. 765.
54 Abd al-Rahman Azzam, “The Arab League and World Unity”, in Contemporary 
Arab Political Thought, ed. by Anouar Abdel Malek, trans. by Michael Pallis (London: 
Zed Press, 1983), p. 144.
55 Resolution 45, Session 3, Schedule 9, 8 April 1946, as translated in Egyptian 
Society of  International Law, Egypt and the United Nations (New York: Manhattan 
Publishing Company for the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1957), p. 138.
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and still several months before the Council of  the Arab League formally 
declared in favour of  Tunisia or Morocco becoming independent from 
the French. Clearly, the Indonesian issue was at the forefront of  its 
diplomatic thinking.56
Later that year, at the October 1946 meeting of  the Arab League, 
the Secretary-General put forward the possibility of  offering up the Arab 
League as a mediator in the conflict between the Indonesians and the 
Dutch. This motion seems not to have been taken forward.57 Further 
action came the next month, when the Council of  the Arab League 
agreed in a unanimous vote of  all seven states to a resolution: “The 
Council recommends to the members of  the Arab League that they 
recognize Indonesia as an independent sovereign state.”58 This made 
the Arab League the first international body to recognize Indonesia’s 
independence.59
The story of  the Arab League’s pro-active stance supporting 
Indonesia centres on the Islamic ideals of  the League’s first Secretary-
General: ‘Abd al-Raḥmān ‘Azzām, commonly called Azzam Pasha. 
Azzam Pasha was born in Egypt in 1893 and raised there, but he 
travelled throughout the Arab world as a young man in the 1920s and 
1930s, including time in exile in Libya and as an Egyptian Minister 
Plenipotentiary between Iraq, Syria, and Saudi Arabia.60 He strongly 
supported the creation of  the Arab League as a unifying body between 
the several Arab states emerging into independence after the Second 
World War --in fact, he supported a stronger vision of  the union than the 
loose body that was created, which verged dangerously on being a mere 
56 Ibid, p. 148.
57 “Sessions in October and November 1946,” in Anita L.P. Burdett, ed., The 
Arab League: British Documentary Sources, 1943-1963, vol. 4 (London: Archive Editions 
and the Foreign Office of  Great Britain, 1995), p. 692.
58 Egyptian Society of  International Law, 138. Cf. 5.37, “International Relations: 
Recognition of  Indonesia Proposed, 1947: Abdul Rahman Azzam to Sir W. Smart, 
27 February 1947 (FO 371/61518),” in Burdett (ed.), The Arab League, vol. 5, p. 744.
59 The role of  the Arab League was recognized only much later by Indonesian 
diplomats, like the country’s chief  negotiator with the Dutch, Mohamad Roem. Roem 
stopped over in Cairo in 1968 to read in the collection of  the Arab League about the 
organization’s support for Indonesia’s independence. See George McTurnan Kahin 
Papers, no. 14-27-3146. Division of  Rare and Manuscript Collections, Cornell University 
Library, Box 7, “Mohamad Roem Correspondence.” I am grateful to Prof. Audrey R. 
Kahin for making this collection available to me.
60 Ralph M. Coury, The Making of  an Egyptian Arab Nationalist: The Early Years of  
Azzam Pasha, 1893-1936 (Reading: Ithaca Press, 1998), p. 15 and passim.
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debating society. His own vision for pan-Arab unity was built on the idea 
of  pan-Islamism (thus pushing even beyond the Islamic brotherhood 
message of  the Indonesian student groups), as laid out in his major work, 
The Eternal Message of  Muhammad.61
In this and other writings, Azzam Pasha made it clear that his 
understanding of  Islam led him to condemn colonialism in the strongest 
terms. He identified it as the aim “underlying world evils” and the cause 
of  suffering for the majority of  the world’s population.62 In fact, Azzam 
even put out a pamphlet in the name of  the Arab League using Islamic 
principles to condemn imperialism. In the conclusion, he wrote, “It is 
a religious duty of  all Moslems to condemn Imperialism. It is a great 
and honourable task for every Arab, true to faith and manly tradition to 
oppose it. A new day of  peace and hope will dawn upon this tortured 
world only when every one of  us, conqueror or conquered alike, realizes 
that Imperialism is a barrier to world stability and peace.”63 Azzam Pasha 
also pushed the idea of  Islamic brotherhood in his own writings, such 
as when he described his vision for Islamic international relations: “We 
pray that people will awaken to guidance, that they will discover in Islamic 
principles the means for establishing international relations on a basis 
other than that of  colonialism, and that this new attitude will rest on the 
Islamic spirit of  brotherhood.”64
These intertwined ideas of  pan-Islamism, anti-colonialism, and 
Islamic brotherhood were clearly motivating factors for Azzam Pasha’s 
actions to support Indonesian independence. When the Arab League 
voted to recognize Indonesian sovereignty, Azzam Pasha was quoted 
in the New York Times pointing to shared histories of  suffering under 
colonialism but also “strong religious and cultural ties with the Indonesian 
people.”65
Azzam Pasha’s actions supporting Islamic solidarity and pan-
Islamic ideas were not universally welcome in or beyond the Arab League. 
61 ‘Abd-al-Rahman ‘Azzam, The Eternal Message of  Muhammad, trans. by Caesar 
E. Farah and Ezzeddin Ibrahim (London: Quartet Books, 1979). This book was first 
published in Arabic in 1946, then with an expanded edition in 1954 that included a 
chapter on the state in the Islamic world.
62 Ibid., p. 217.
63 Abdul-Rahman Azzam, Imperialism: The Barrier to World Peace (Cairo: 
Government Press, 1947), p. 12.
64 ‘‘Azzam, The Eternal Message, p. 220.
65 “Arabs Hail Indonesians: League of  Seven States Votes to Recognize New 
Republic”, The New York Times (19 Nov 1946).
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Non-Muslims in the Arab world, particularly in Lebanon, worried that 
Azzam Pasha was more interested in giving a pan-Islamic rather than 
pan-Arab character to the League.66 European powers still active in the 
Middle East felt very uncomfortable with his ideology and his demeanour, 
as one British diplomat in Iraq wrote in 1947: “Azzam is most unpopular 
here for his arrogance, his irresponsible actions, and his tendency to 
exploit the Arab League for personal ends.”67
Despite these reservations about Azzam Pasha, his support was 
very effective at pushing the Indonesian issue onto the agenda of  the Arab 
League, with key diplomatic consequences. This action on Indonesia set 
a precedent for the Arab League to work as a bloc in diplomatic affairs 
in the United Nations, and Azzam Pasha identified cooperation on the 
Indonesia question as one of  the building-blocks for the later creation 
of  the Asia-Africa bloc.68 This also paved the way for direct Indonesian 
relations with individual Arab states, relations that were sometimes 
(although not always) based on Islam.
E. An Arab League Delegation to Indonesia, and State-to-State 
Relations
The year 1947 was a crucial turning point in the Indonesian 
Revolution, especially in Indonesian diplomacy. The Islamically-
based contacts with the Arab League led to three major diplomatic 
milestones: the first foreign diplomatic delegation to visit the Indonesian 
revolutionary capital; the participation of  an Indonesian delegation at a 
major international diplomatic conference; and the first foreign treaties 
recognizing Indonesian independence.
The first foreign diplomatic visit to the Republic of  Indonesia 
was initiated by Azzam Pasha in Cairo. In January 1947, he informed 
the British government that he would be sending a representative of  
the Arab League to Indonesia and asked for British facilities to ease the 
sending of  such an envoy.69 The British were alarmed and dismayed 
66 “Criticism of  Abdul Rahman Azzam” in Burdett (ed.), The Arab League, p. 399.
67 “Criticism of  the Secretary-General of  the Arab League, Abdul Rahman 
Azzam, 1947: British Embassy, Baghdad to Foreign Secretary, 3 March 1947,” in Ibid., 
4: 418.
68 He is quoted on this point in Egyptian Society of  International Law, Egypt 
and the United Nations, pp. 73-4.
69 “International Relations: Recognition of  Indonesia Proposed, 1947: Sir R. 
Campbell, Cairo to Foreign Office, 8 January 1947, and response, 13 January 1947,” in 
Burdett (ed.), The Arab League, 4: 739, 743.
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at this prospect, but they were not in a position to stop the initiative.70 
This was particularly so because the initiative to send a delegate was 
also strongly supported by Saudi Arabia, which was interested primarily 
because of  the large number of  Indonesian pilgrims who undertook 
the hajj every year --another Islamic connection in foreign relations that 
continued through to the end of  the revolution.71 In February 1947, 
despite strong discouragement from both the British and the Dutch, 
Azzam Pasha felt that the Arab League was in a position to act on its 
own.72 By March 1947, he had arranged for the Egyptian Consul General 
in Bombay, Muhammad Abdul Munim, to travel to the revolutionary 
capital in Yogyakarta, Central Java.73 
Abdul Munim made it clear during his visit to Indonesia that 
Islamic motivations were central in the Arab support for Indonesian 
independence and in prompting his visit. While in Yogyakarta, the 
diplomat said, “It is the Islamic brotherhood that gave rise to the support 
for the struggle of  the Indonesian people. The spirit of  Islam tells us to 
oppose all forms of  colonialism which in essence is a practice of  slavery.”74 
President Sukarno’s speech to honour this diplomatic guest expressed 
a similar sentiment, although perhaps not quite as strongly: “It is only 
natural that relations with Arab countries are easily made strong, because 
of  the religious connection that already binds us together.”75
This diplomatic visit was clearly both important and moving to the 
leadership of  Indonesia, as evidenced by the actions of  Vice-President 
Muhammad Hatta. After having pledged himself  to celibacy so long 
as Indonesia was still under colonial rule, Hatta had finally married in 
70 Ibid., 4: 740.
71 Ibid., 4: 739.
72 Ibid., 4: 744.
73 Egyptian Society of  International Law, Egypt and the United Nations, p. 74, 
n. 6. Alternative spellings of  his name include Abdel Mounem, Abdul Mun’im, and 
various other combinations. The record, including primary sources from various sides, 
is mixed as to whether he was representing Egypt, the Arab League, or both, but his 
travels were clearly prompted by Azzam Pasha.
74 Rizal Sukma, Islam in Indonesian Foreign Policy (London: Routledge Curzon, 
2003), pp. 27–8.
75 Hassan, Diplomasi Revolusi, p. 194. The full speeches of  both Abdul Munim 
and Sukarno were reprinted in the official English-language propaganda of  the Republic 
of  Indonesia: Voice of  Free Indonesia, no. 62 (12 April 1947). Unfortunately, I have not 
been able to secure a copy of  this issue.
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November 1945, months after the proclamation of  independence.76 In 
March 1947, coinciding with the visit of  Abdul Munim, he and his wife 
welcomed their first child into the world, a daughter whom they named 
Meutia Farida Hatta. The girl’s middle name, Farida, was given in honour 
of  the queen of  Egypt, Queen Farida, wife of  King Farouk II, as a token 
of  gratitude that the Egyptian government had sent the first foreign 
diplomat to the revolutionary capital.77
The visit of  Abdul Munim was also crucial because it allowed 
an Indonesian diplomatic delegation to get past a Dutch blockade and 
exit Indonesia in March 1947, en route to their first major international 
summit. Apparently the Egyptian diplomat had agreed to allow members 
of  the Indonesian delegation to join him on the flight to Singapore, 
but he was surprised when twenty-four individuals (still not the whole 
delegation) were on board --well above the plane’s listed capacity. Abdul 
Munim justified this by saying that the Indonesian delegation “consisted 
of  very thin and light men”; the plane made it off  the runway with some 
difficulty, but the delegation was able to start their journey to India to 
attend the Asian Relations Conference in Delhi.78
Although participation in the Asian Relations Conference was 
a significant moment for Indonesia, the conference did not focus on 
the Indonesia’s independence; the tenor of  the meeting was general 
anti-colonialism and promotion of  pan-Asian solidarity. Indonesia’s 
participation increased its diplomatic profile abroad, including solidifying 
relations with India, a state that proved a major supporter in the United 
Nations. Importantly, though, Indonesia was only able to send a 
delegation because of  the support provided by the Arab League envoy 
to get the diplomats past the Dutch blockade --thus again making Islamic 
connections critical in the development of  Indonesian diplomacy. In 
the wake of  the conference, relations with Arab states again took centre 
stage, as Junior Foreign Minister H. Agus Salim travelled onward from 
Delhi to the Middle East to engage in state-to-state diplomacy.
76 Theodore Friend, Indonesian Destinies (Cambridge: Belknap Press of  Harvard 
University Press, 2003), p. 28.
77 This was confirmed to me in a personal communication from her sister 
Halida Hatta, (17 Jun 2013).
78 Sastroamidjojo, Milestones on My Journey, pp. 134–5; Abu Hanifah, Tales of  a 
Revolution (Sydney: Angus and Robertson Education, 1972), p. 217. A full account of  the 
Asian Relations conference can be found in Asian Relations, being Report of  the Proceedings 
and Documentation of  the First Asian Relations Conference, New Delhi, March-April, 1947 (New 
Delhi, India: Asian Relations Organization, 1948).
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In the Middle East, Salim secured the de jure recognition of  the 
Republic of  Indonesia by several Arab governments, starting with 
Egypt. The treaty signed on 10 June 1947, included articles to protect 
the friendship between the two countries with appropriate regulations 
to protect mutual peace and tranquillity, to establish diplomatic relations, 
and to agree to a temporary trade treaty, to be followed by a permanent 
commerce treaty soon afterward.79 Although the treaty itself  makes 
no explicit mention of  Islam or shared cultural values, the Indonesian 
delegate was one of  the country’s diplomats who was known for 
supporting Islamic solidarity. Salim himself  was closely aligned with the 
Islamic party in Indonesia, Masjumi; had led the Sarekat Islam at various 
phases as both a social movement and political party; and had strong 
Islamic beliefs and experience in the Middle East dating back to his own 
time working in the Dutch consulate in Jeddah thirty years earlier.80 More 
explicit was the response by the Egyptian Prime Minister at the time, 
who said when receiving Salim and his delegation, “as a state based in 
Islam, there is no other choice [for Egypt ] but to support the struggle 
of  the Indonesian people who are also Muslim.”81 This bond was forged 
not only in mutual anti-colonial interests, but specifically in a context of  
Islamic solidarity.
After the treaty with Egypt, H. Agus Salim continued his travels 
around the Arab world, securing recognition in Lebanon, Syria, and Iraq 
in the months of  June and July 1947.82 Working with other diplomats, 
Saudi Arabia and Yemen followed with recognition within the next year.83 
All of  these formal recognitions were crucial for Indonesia to prevent 
the Dutch from denying international status to the Indonesian conflict 
(especially before the UN). Indonesia did not expect military support 
from its new allies, but diplomatic support in seeking an internationally-
79 Official copies of  this treaty in Indonesian, Arabic, and French can be found 
in Arsip Nasional Republic Indonesia, koleksi RA3 Djodjakarta Documenten, no. 15 
“Surat perjanjian persahabatan antara Republik Indonesia dengan negara kerajaan Mesir 
tanggal 10 Juni 1947.”
80 On Salim’s previous time in the Middle East and his Islamic nationalism, see 
Laffan, Islamic Nationhood and Colonial Indonesia, pp. 181–9.
81 Sukma, Islam in Indonesian, pp. 27–8.
82 “Indonesians Form a ‘Peace’ Cabinet,” New York Times (July 4, 1947); Leifer, 
“The Islamic Factor in Indonesia’s Foreign Policy”, pp.150-1.
83 Sukma, Islam in Indonesian, p. 27; Abu Hanifah, Tales of  a Revolution, p. 263; 
adds to this list Afghanistan, which recognized Indonesia in September 1947. Note 
that this was another Islamic monarchy.
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mediated solution was at the forefront of  the young state’s thinking.
It is also important to note that the move towards formal relations 
did not mean that the tradition of  activism from the Indonesian student 
community in Cairo was lost. The first Indonesian Ambassador to Egypt, 
H. M. Rasjidi, had been a student in Cairo in the 1930s, and had even 
served as a commissioner of  Perpindom when the organization was 
created (at the merger of  two earlier Indonesian organizations) in 1937.84 
In January 1946, Rasjidi had been appointed Indonesia’s first Minister of  
Religion, but he moved out of  this role fairly soon and started working 
for the foreign ministry. 85 When H. Agus Salim came to Cairo in 1947, 
Rasjidi was appointed as the official representative of  the Republic of  
Indonesia for Egypt and Saudi Arabia.86 As of  1948, Rasjidi was the only 
official representative of  Indonesia in the Middle East, although there 
were additional representative offices in Pakistan and Afghanistan.87 Nor 
was Rasjidi the only former student in Indonesia’s new, official diplomatic 
office in Cairo; Fu’ad Fakhreddin, who had come from West Sumatra 
to Cairo to study in 1928 and had married an Egyptian woman, was 
absorbed into Indonesia’s local diplomatic office upon its establishment.88
From 1945 and 1946, when the cause of  Indonesian diplomacy 
in the Arab world had been led by societal initiatives by diaspora 
communities, Indonesia’s support among Arab Muslim countries grew to 
concrete and formal relations in 1947. Thus, the de jure recognition that 
did not couch itself  in Islamic terms was still built on the foundation of  
“Islamic brotherhood” propaganda and support from Islamically-minded 
politicians, and the Islamic influence in diplomacy often spilled over into 
the speeches or writings of  these leaders. The bonds built in 1947, though, 
84 Jafizham, Studenten Indonesia, p. 88. For a fuller biography of  Rasjidi, consult 
Azyumardi Azra, “Guarding the Faith of  the Ummah: Religio-Intellectual Journey of  
Mohammad Rasjidi”, Studia Islamika, vol. 1, no. 2 (2014), pp. 87–119.
85 Rasjidi’s official transfer to the Ministry of  Foreign Affairs was only executed 
in January 1948, after he had already been working with Foreign Affairs for some time. 
See this transfer letter signed by Sukarno in Arsip Nasional Republik Indonesia, Koleksi 
RA2 Sekretariat Negara RI 1945-1949, no.  574 “Presiden RI: Surat Keputusan No. 
1/P.CIV/48 tgl. 12 Januari 1948 tentang pemberhentian dengan hormat H. Rasjidi dari 
jabatannya sebagai Sekretaris Jenderal Kementerian Agama.”
86 H.M. Tahir Azhary, “In Memoriam: Almarhum Prof. Dr. H.M. Rasjidi (1915-
2001): Birokrat Muslim, Diplomat dan Pemikir Islam”, in Bunga Rampai Hukum Islam: 
Kumpulan Tulisan (Jakarta: Ind Hill-Co, 2003), p. ix. 
87 Osman Raliby, Fragmenta Politica (Koetaradja, Atjeh: Djabatan Penerangan 
Atjeh, 1948), p. 199.
88 Abaza, Indonesian Students in Cairo, p. 83.
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also mark a turning point for Islam in Indonesia’s formal diplomacy and 
for the pioneering position of  Arab countries in supporting Indonesia’s 
independence. Changes in the geo-politics of  the Middle East distracted 
the Arab League and its members from Indonesia, and at the same time 
other countries and international bodies took up the Indonesian cause 
in their stead.
F. Support on the International Stage and the Decline of  Arab/
Islamic Relations
From 1948, two changes in the international world caused a decline 
in the role of  Arab countries in Indonesian revolutionary diplomacy. The 
first was the willingness of  the UN and major Western powers, specifically 
the US, to take up the Indonesian case, making support from the Arab 
world less crucial. The second was a crisis on the doorstep of  the Arab 
League, causing them to focus all attention on the Palestinian question.
The progress of  international diplomacy on the world stage around 
Indonesia’s independence has been well-documented elsewhere,89 but it is 
worth noting how Indonesian revolutionary diplomacy in other countries 
was similar to and divergent from the experience in Arab countries. In 
the initial stages, diplomacy was similarly conducted by self-appointed 
Indonesians in residence abroad, lobbying in the public sphere and 
calling on governments as they were able.90 Also, across countries that 
had recently exited colonialism or were soon to do so, the Indonesian 
struggle was connected with their own struggle against a European power. 
This was true most notably in India, where Jawaharlal Nehru strongly 
criticized the Dutch in Indonesia but also the British for their role in the 
re-occupation of  the archipelago and for their continuing colonialism 
in South Asia.91 Looking at South Asia, Australia, and the Arab world, 
Indonesian activists appealed to whatever means of  solidary presented 
itself  --anti-colonial solidarity, working class solidarity, and Islamic 
brotherhood, respectively-- to draw the sympathy of  the general public 
and political leaders.
Unlike the Arab countries’ move in late 1946 and 1947 to afford full 
de facto and de jure recognition to the Republic of  Indonesia, though, other 
89 The inaugural work of  this literature was Taylor, Indonesian Independence; the 
whole progress of  diplomacy leading to Indonesia’s independence is also included in 
Kahin, alongside the narrative of  the Revolution on the ground.
90 Crowl, “Indonesia’s Diplomatic Revolution”, p. 239.
91 Ibid., pp. 243–4.
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countries only took the intermediate step of  recognizing the Republic’s 
de facto control of  certain territories on Java and Sumatra --following the 
lead of  the Dutch who had themselves made such a concession in the 
Linggajati agreement of  November 1946.92 Instead of  focusing on direct 
diplomacy and recognition, countries like Australia and India instead 
tried to work through the new international body of  the United Nations 
Organization. This was facilitated by the fact that the Arab countries 
had already recognized de jure the independence of  the Indonesian state, 
making this a disagreement among the existing members of  the United 
Nations and thus preventing the Dutch from blocking proposals to debate 
the Indonesian question. When the question was debated by countries 
beyond the Islamic world, of  course, the theme of  Islamic brotherhood 
was not deployed; instead, rhetoric of  anti-colonialism, human rights, 
and justice took centre stage.
The method of  internationalizing the conflict and seeking 
resolution through the United Nations foreshadowed the main technique 
deployed by decolonizing countries from the 1950s forward. The case of  
Algeria, where drawing in the United States, Great Britain, Spain, Egypt, 
and others was just as important as fighting on the ground, has been 
well- documented.93 The Indonesian experience differed in a number of  
ways, though. Indonesia was engaged in this effort before clear blocs 
had emerged in the UN; indeed, the Indonesian question of  the 1940s 
has been cited by some actors as an important foundation for the later 
emergence of  the Asia-Africa bloc. Additionally, the Netherlands was 
not engaged in the same kind of  worldwide diplomatic push to win allies, 
instead focusing only on the US and European neighbours. Finally, it 
seems as though actors in the decolonizing world, especially Egypt and 
other Arab states, were acting from a more altruistic place in supporting 
Indonesia, as compared with the quirks of  Nasser’s policies in the 1950s 
that determined the shifts in support for Morocco, Tunisia, and Algeria.94 
The major similarity between the Indonesian conflict and later diplomatic 
efforts for other countries’ decolonization, though, was the importance 
of  internationalizing the conflict by seeking the recognition and support 
of  other sovereign states --a policy pursued most effectively in the Arab 
92 Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution, pp. 196–7; Crowl, “Indonesia’s Diplomatic 
Revolution”, pp. 244–5.
93 Matthew James Connelly, Diplomatic Revolution: Algeria’s Fight for Independence 
and the Origins of  the Post-Cold War Era (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002).
94 Ibid., p. 100ff.
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world and through Islamic brotherhood.
The effort to mediate the Dutch-Indonesian conflict in the United 
Nations accelerated after the Dutch violated the Linggajati agreement 
with a major military aggression (euphemized by the Dutch as a “Police 
Action”) on July 20, 1947.95 On July 30, India and Australia each referred 
the Indonesian issue to the Security Council.96 That began a process 
leading to later treaties, greater UN involvement through the creation of  
a Committee of  Good Offices, and eventually a Roundtable Conference 
where the Dutch were forced to recognize Indonesian independence and 
arrange for a full transfer of  sovereignty in 1949.
As the case was carried to the UN by other countries, Arab 
and Muslim actors remained supportive, but less actively involved. In 
December 1948, after a second Dutch military aggression (again called 
by the Dutch side a “Police Action”), the Arab League called on the 
Security Council to step in and stop the violence.97 In March 1949, the 
Arab League resolved to congratulate Nehru for his work on Indonesian 
advocacy. 98 Later that year, representatives in many Arab countries 
joined Nehru in New Delhi for another international affairs conference, 
which included a resolution against Dutch military actions. 99 All of  these 
instances were less impactful than the initial recognition of  Indonesia, 
however, and most of  them were focused on calling for action on the 
part of  others. Azzam Pasha claimed that Egypt and the Arab League 
had to call for other states to take action because they had already focused 
their energies on Palestine.100
Indeed, the Palestinian crisis that emerged with the creation of  
Israel did become the overwhelming issue for Arab countries in 1948 that 
restrained them from continuing to be the vanguard in the diplomatic 
efforts to secure Indonesia’s independence. From 1947, it was already 
clear in the speeches of  the Arab delegates at the Asian Relations 
Conference that this was the primary international interest of  the majority 
of  their countrymen at this time.101 In many ways this topic also played 
on themes of  Islamic solidarity, and the effort to seek resolution through 
95 Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution, p. 214.
96 Crowl, “Indonesia’s Diplomatic Revolution”, p. 246.
97 “Arabs Back Indonesia”, The New York Times (22 Dec 1948).
98 Egyptian Society of  International Law, Egypt and the United Nations, p. 75.
99 Dipoyudo, “Indonesia’s Foreign Policy”, p. 476.
100 Egyptian Society of  International Law, Egypt and the United Nations, pp. 73-4.
101 Asian Relations, being Report of  the Proceedings and Documentation of  the First Asian 
Relations Conference, New Delhi, March-April, 1947, pp. 63–4.
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the UN was often compared to the earlier path of  the Indonesian case 
winding its way through the Security Council, showing the importance 
of  the Indonesian case for the Muslim world more broadly.102 As this 
issue rose to a boil in 1948, it was only natural that the Arab bloc could 
not be on the forefront of  advocating for Indonesia, when all attention 
was focused on its own region.
Even Indonesia, despite not having attained full recognition of  its 
independence, wanted to become involved in supporting the Palestinian 
cause. In 1946, Indonesia had made a major diplomatic statement with the 
promise to ship 500,000 tons of  rice to India, as a contribution to famine 
relief  in the subcontinent. The Indians accepted this offer enthusiastically, 
and even though restrictions by the Dutch (who controlled major ports) 
severely curtailed the shipment, the impact on international goodwill 
was still made.103 Hoping to build on this success, the first Indonesian 
ambassador to Cairo, H. Rasjidi, proposed to arrange a shipment of  rice 
for the Palestinians in June 1948.104 By September of  that year, Rasjidi 
was still working to arrange for the shipment, which was expanded 
to include both rice and sugar, but arrangements to evade the Dutch 
blockade were providing a great hindrance.105 It seems that the shipment 
never came to fruition.
The conflict in Palestine also made Arab League members 
more reticent to send permanent representatives to Indonesia. The 
Egyptian government promised the Indonesian ambassador in Cairo 
that it was interested in sending an ambassador to Yogyakarta, but the 
Egyptians feared that if  the Dutch recognized Israel then the Egyptian 
ambassador might become a target for wartime violence.106 For this 
reason the Egyptians sought a resolution from the Arab League to 
provide diplomatic cover for sending such a permanent representative, 
102 See “Truce in Palestine”, The New York Times (10 Jun 1948); Clifton Daniel, 
“The Moslem World Watches Palestine”, The New York Times (13 Jul 1948).
103 Henry Knight, Food Administration in India, 1939-1947 (Stanford, CA: Stanford 
University Press, 1954), pp. 260–1.
104 Arsip Nasional Republik Indonesia, Koleksi RA3 “Djogdja Documenten 
1945-1949,” no. 306: “Surat-surat dari Perwakilan Republik Indonesia di beberapa 
negara,” undated letter from H. Rasjidi.
105 Arsip Nasional Republik Indonesia, Koleksi RA3 “Djogdja Documenten 
1945-1949,” no. 306: “Surat-surat dari Perwakilan Republik Indonesia di beberapa 
negara,” telegram from Cairo dated 3 September 1948.
106 Arsip Nasional Republik Indonesia, Koleksi RA3 “Djogdja Documenten 
1945-1949,” no. 306: “Surat-surat dari Perwakilan Republik Indonesia di beberapa 
negara,” letter from H. Rasjidi dated 21 September 1948.
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but no resolution was ever passed to this effect.107 The communication 
from Cairo in 1948 shows that the Palestinian issue eclipsed Indonesian 
independence as a diplomatic concern, and that the members of  the Arab 
League no longer felt themselves in a position to stand at the forefront 
of  efforts to support Indonesia.
Still, at the very end of  the Revolution, the Indonesian government 
looked to the Arab countries as an important bloc for supporting 
their independence. As the Round Table Conference convened in the 
Netherlands to determine conditions for the transfer of  sovereignty, the 
Indonesian government appointed a special hajj delegation in September 
1949. Before this delegation left the Republican capital of  Yogyakarta, 
one of  its participants was reportedly instructed by Indonesian President 
Sukarno, “If  the negotiations in Den Haag fail, the [hajj ] mission cannot 
return home to Indonesia; it must remain longer in the Arab and 
North African countries, with the duty to explain to their leaders and 
governments in those countries about the struggle of  the Republic of  
Indonesia, so that they can help the Indonesian nation in its physical 
struggle as well as diplomatic struggle.”108 The delegation did go to the 
Hijaz for a month, participating in the hajj and providing a gift to the 
King of  Saudi Arabia, followed by two months in Cairo, where they also 
received Vice-President Hatta on his return journey from the successful 
Round Table Conference negotiations.109 The vision of  this delegation 
carrying on the work of  reaching out to Arab governments and leaders, 
as had been done by independent students at the start of  the Revolution, 
presents an interesting book-end to Indonesian diplomatic activities in 
the Arab world. This is especially demonstrative since this hajj mission 
was formally sent by the government, rather than a popular movement, 
thus demonstrating the trend towards formalization of  relations over 
the course of  these four years.
The actions of  the Indonesians were no longer eliciting major 
reactions in Cairo or Mecca, though, both because such reactions were 
no longer needed and because the Arab world was by 1949 so wrapped 
up in its own region. In this context, it was easy to forget the important 
107 Arsip Nasional Republik Indonesia, Koleksi RA3 “Djogdja Documenten 
1945-1949,” no. 306: “Surat-surat dari Perwakilan Republik Indonesia di beberapa 
negara,” letter from H. Rasjidi dated 29 September 1948; cf. Burdett (ed.), The Arab 
League., pp. 739-40.
108 Ali Hasjmy, Semangat Merdeka: 70 Tahun Menempuh Jalan Pergolakan & Perjuangan 
Kemerdekaan (Jakarta: Bulan Bintang, 1985), p. 391.
109 Ibid., pp. 389–95.
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role Arab countries had played in the initial diplomatic achievements of  
the young Republic of  Indonesia.
G. Concluding Remarks
Building up from the history of  Indonesian foreign policy in this 
early era, it is clear that Islam did have a prominent role, not particularly 
as an ideology on which to base policy or as rhetoric to justify policy 
to domestic audiences, but as an instrument to enact policy. Indonesia 
deployed Islamic connections to build its early alliances. This corrects 
the current literature that has seen no place for Islam in Indonesia’s 
foreign policy.
Although Islam was crucial for policy execution in the early 
years of  Indonesian independence, this action did not come from 
the newly independent government nor from government-appointed 
representatives. Instead, Islam was deployed by societal groups at some 
distance from the state (both ideologically and geographically). Perhaps 
it is because this action was initiated by society and not by the state that 
official accounts --and the scholarship that has followed official sources-- 
have been short-sighted on the place of  religion in Indonesian foreign 
policy.
The influence of  society to increase the religious content of  
Indonesian foreign policy is in keeping with other Muslim-majority 
countries. As Brenda Shaffer found through comparative work in the 
Caucasus, Central Asia, and the Middle East: “In regimes where foreign 
policy was not controlled by a central actor, more opportunity for 
promotion of  culturally-based interests seems to exist.” The “culturally-
based interest” that showed this trend most clearly was religion.110 The 
Indonesian case study above reinforces this finding, but also amplifies 
it; “culturally-based interests” such as religion are a function not only 
of  regime structure, but also of  the contingent circumstances in which 
foreign policy develops, and when such circumstances do not facilitate 
control by a central actor, religion has a stronger position in policy.
For the study of  Indonesian foreign relations, demonstrating the 
important role of  Islam in this case demands that studies moving forward 
must be reframed. Thus, scholars should no longer ask whether or why 
Islam has not been invoked or not been central, but rather why the initial 
110 Brenda Shaffer, “Introduction: The Limits of  Culture”, in Limits of  Culture: 
Islam and Foreign Policy, ed. by Brenda Shaffer (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2006), p. 6. 
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use of  Islam was later jettisoned in favour of  entirely secular international 
relations, and how social groups differ from the Indonesian government 
in presenting the country abroad. This also has implications for how the 
young Indonesian government perceived itself  in emerging networks of  
newly sovereign states; the roots of  the non-aligned movement need to be 
seen as Islamic, especially in connecting Indonesia with the Arab world, 
in addition to anti-colonial or anti-Western. Finally, the initial success of  
societal groups in the Middle East and their subsequent decline should 
remind scholars to consider contingency in the evaluation of  foreign 
policy shifts.
Looking beyond foreign policy, this case should prompt scholars 
to think differently about the role of  Islam in the state. Although studies 
have already pointed toward the increased strength of  Islam in society 
and the growing place of  Islam in government since the fall of  Soeharto,111 
they have not connected the turn towards Islam with a decrease in central 
state power. As early foreign policy demonstrates, the greater strength of  
society vis-à-vis the state --as Indonesia has seen since 1998-- provides a 
more likely environment for religious influences on policy, often carried 
by societal actors.
Indonesia is not now, nor has it been historically, as religiously 
neutral as its state rhetoric presents the country.112 Instead, Islam has 
had a role that ebbs and flows in relation to the strength of  society to 
promote this religious interest, in foreign policy or other manifestations.
111 Ricklefs, Islamisation and Its Opponents in Java.
112 Jeremy Menchik, “Productive Intolerance: Godly Nationalism in Indonesia”, 
Comparative Studies in Society and History, vol. 56, no. 3 (2014), pp. 591–621.
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